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12. WHY COMPLEXITY MATTERS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the issue of plurality and complexity in contemporary, globalized society through the lens of discourse theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 1993/2005; Laclau, 2005). It explains plurality in discourse theoretical terms of difference and antagonism. It explains emerging populism in the EU as a result of increased instrumentalization and universalization of modern politics. It leads to the insight that Hannah Arendt's warnings concerning the importance of maintaining plurality in the public realm are relevant today.

To situate this account on plurality in the 21st century, this chapter presents a series of ontological views about the specific nature of the 21st century which have been elaborated by various academics, in comparison with the ontological view of the EU. While the academic accounts seem to grasp the dynamics of our times, the EU worldview appears as static. It shows the features of a silent ideology as described in Chapter 4. Based on earlier research and related readings, I will then depict a series of features pertaining to 21st century society in general, and to education in particular, which I believe to be symptoms of a society under the impact of a silent ideology. This chapter distinguishes itself from the chapters in part II in the sense that it does not present new research. It contains a re-reading of research performed earlier, through the lens of the theoretical framework and the account on normative professionalization as developed in this volume. The research projects I draw on, include research on induction (Fruytier, Goorhuis & Montesano Montessori, 2013)ⁱ; social justice (Montesano Montessori & Ponte, 2012)ⁱⁱ; social entrepreneurship (Montesano Montessori, 2016)ⁱⁱⁱ and an analysis of EU documents on the discourse of lifelong learning^{iv}. These two academic operations: looking at plurality from the point of view of discourse theory and the re-reading of earlier research through the lens of normative professionalization have led to a series of insights – the recognizing of the specific features mentioned above among them – which will be presented throughout the chapter. The chapter ends with a discourse theorist perspective on how to rearrange society in the direction of a pluralist *res publica* characterized by an ethico-political contract to which citizens, while maintaining their plurality, will abide (Mouffe, 1993/2005). It then dwells on the question as to what such a perspective would require of education. This leads to the conclusion that many aspects advocated in the earlier chapters, such as morality, virtuosity and subjectification, are indeed very important and should become part of mainstream education and teacher education. However, for schools to implement this change, a discursive change in the EU discourse on lifelong-learning might be required.

A DISCURSIVE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY AND PLURALITY

A crucial assumption in discourse theory is the antagonistic character of social fields. Politics is based on the antagonisms that necessarily exist. A social order is by definition constituted through different discourses which may cooperate or compete with each other. Full closure of a discourse would exclude all other meanings; full openness would not make sense: it would lead to chaos. Therefore, difference will always be negotiated and discourses will seek a point of balance:

Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 112).

To understand the discursive construction of these necessary antagonisms, Laclau and Mouffe have introduced the *logic of equivalence* and the *logic of difference* (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp. 127-34). The logic of equivalence

functions by creating equivalential identities which express a pure negation of a particular discursive system. In so doing, it divides social space into two antagonistic poles. An example would be the pillarized system in the Netherlands as described by Van der Zande in Chapter 6. The logic of equivalence is often discursively constructed through an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ distinction. The logic of difference marginalizes difference while emphasizing commonality. It is often found in organizations (Howarth, 2000, p. 107). Within the mentioned pillars, the logic of difference would bring different identities together such as the rich and poor who all join the same church, for instance. In general, these two logics never fully exclude each other (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp. 127-134; Laclau, 2005, p. 78; Torfing, 1999, pp. 96-97). It is precisely in the continuous struggle, in some cases more explicit and in other cases more dormant, that the antagonisms in a pluralist society are being played out:

Between the logic of complete identity and that of pure difference, the experience of democracy should consist of the recognition of the multiplicity of social logics along with the necessity of their articulation. But this articulation should be constantly recreated and renegotiated, and there is no final point at which a balance will be definitively achieved (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 188).

However, these dynamics between adversary groups currently do not play out in the same way as they did before. In the nineteenth century, liberal democracy grew out of intense political struggles which led to the political democratization of the state. Democracy became a field of competition between different parties who were out to win the votes of the masses. Within a democracy, however, there is a tension between liberal and democratic forces, since each of them represents different values. Liberalism entails pluralism, freedom and individualism, whereas a democracy requires values like unity, communality and equality (Torfing, 1999, p. 249). Since the 1980s however, for several complex reasons, social democrat parties started to move to the political middle and committed themselves to the new neoliberal regimes. They did so with more emphasis on social justice, but increasingly denied the previous frontiers between left and right (see Fairclough, 2000, 2006 for details). This has led to a blurring between right and left, thus contributing to a decreased plurality in the political field and dissatisfaction within the traditional constituency of both parties. Mouffe warns that an excess of consensus tends to mask apathy and represents a danger to a democracy (Mouffe, 1993/2005). It paves the way for external, antidemocratic forces to create antidemocratic passions and antagonistic enemies, such as foreigners, migrants or, for instance, the elite. These antidemocratic forces might represent an attractive alternative to those who feel excluded or no longer represented by the ruling system. It is in these terms that both Laclau (2005) and Mouffe (1993/2005) explain the phenomenon of rising populism in Europe – emerging both from the right and left side of the spectrum as will be explained below^v. They maintain that populists jump in the void which currently exists in democracy in the west.

With the apparent victory of capitalism after the collapse of communism – for decades the constitutive other for the west – the path seemed to be open for a uniform, universal order after history appeared to have come to an end. A rationalist, universal political system has emerged, which attributes citizens with universal individual rights. While at first sight this procedure seems to be good news for equality, it does not take the different interests of minorities – or the moral duty to take these interests seriously – into account. In fact, the system relies on a strong belief in the effects of the free market economy which requires deregulation, a smaller role for the state and – as we have experienced – a cut down of the welfare state (see Sayer, 2014). But the free market does not create social justice on its own accord. Citizens do not just need equal rights, they require the right to have their primary needs covered in terms of a basic income, affordable houses and an affordable life style. To achieve this, regulation is needed. It requires both political and social will for both companies and citizens to agree on paying taxes and to accept that some of their wealth will go to the weaker groups in society in order to protect the life style of these groups, and to arrange a socially just and stable society. These kind of issues require a sense of morality and a common sense of social justice. The universalized, rational, individualist governance that Mouffe takes issue with, remains silent about morality. Morality has been reduced to ‘values’ and is removed from the public sphere and left marginalized in the private sphere (Mouffe, 1993/2005). Whatever values governments may have, such as like ‘remaining within budgets’ or the ‘participatory society’ for instance, are being claimed as facts, as ‘taken for granted’, as part of a silent ideology. In addition, modern politics offers very little to get emotional about. These lacks in hegemonic, neoliberal rule are being exploited by populists (Laclau, 2005). Populists recreate the frontier of difference within the political field. However, they do not do this by applying the principle of *adversaries* that should be tolerated, but by constructing *enemies*, who should be excluded or eliminated. A second void that populists successfully fill, is that of emotions. Modern, instrumentalized democracy is free of emotions; there is nothing to hope or to strive for. There is a lack of human purpose. Populists, in turn, live by emotions, but these tend to be negative emotions of fear, anger and hatred. Populists bring passion back to the political field, like the passion for nationalism for instance, which, in part, explains their political attraction. (Laclau, 2005; Stavrakakis, 2005). Adding this discourse theoretical account on pluralism and populism to the perspectives elaborated in this book, leads to the insight that Hannah Arendt’s warnings about protecting plurality as

a precondition in order to build and maintain a democracy are, indeed, highly relevant today. It tells us that we need to reinstall plurality, morality, and emotions and human purpose in our democratic system for it to survive.

ONTOLOGICAL WORLDVIEWS CONCERNING THE 21ST CENTURY

Ontology can be defined as the ‘science or study of being’ (Blaikie, 2010). Drawing on Somers (1994) who distinguishes an ontological dimension in her model for narrative analysis, I consider ontological worldviews to be a specific kind of worldviews that shape the main elements of the society they depict. Ontological narratives provide a ‘narrative location’, endowing social actors with identities (Idem, p. 618), and form the basis for action. “Ontological narratives affect activities, consciousness and beliefs and are in turn, affected by them” (Somers, 1994, p. 618 and see Montesano Montessori, 2016 for details). In other words, these are narratives that contain basic presuppositions about how the world works and what it represents. In this section, I will present several ontological worldviews concerning the 21st century which have been elaborated by different sociologists, like Anthony Giddens, Zygmunt Bauman and the Dutch academic Jan Rotmans, who is specialized in transitions and transition management. I will then proceed to compare these ontological narratives with that of the EU.

A World in Transition

There is some agreement on the fact that we live in a time of radical transition, radically different from the 20th century, due to rapid technological progress and the acceleration of globalization. The internet, technology and the social media have led to processes of ‘time-space distantiation’ (Giddens, 1981). Technology has an impact on all the fields of our life: how we live, how we work, how we teach and learn, how we manage our private and professional relations, and so on. As a result, several visions have become paramount. Rotmans (2015) describes that we currently live in a period of threefold transition: a fundamental modification is taking place in the domains of the social organization, the power structures in society and the economy. He states that we live in a transition period between a vertical hierarchical society with a dominant role for the state and its institutions, to a society characterized by horizontal, decentralized communities and networks. It is rare that generations live in periods during which multiple parallel transitions take place, as is now the case. It is a form of radical change that cannot be dealt with by relying on lessons from the past. According to Zygmunt Bauman (2000) we live in a liquid modernity, in which relations, identities, economic models and other models are in constant flux. The British sociologist Anthony Giddens (2014) points out that we live in a time of high risk and high opportunity. Modern technology, digitalization and new communication systems definitely provide us with unknown opportunities. However, they also carry risks, like the rapidly changing social environments due to mass migration, increased violence, terrorism, new viruses, the stress of dealing with information, among others. Giddens states that both the opportunities and risks are of an unknown scale. Like Rotmans, he also states that we cannot address this complex and unpredictable combination of risks and opportunities with models taken from the past.

Compared to these dynamic definitions of the society we live in, the ontology presented by the EU – since its recent formation of a single market through the treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997), culminating in a single currency, the Euro; and since the establishment of the free movement of goods, services, people and capital – stands out as being static. Though the EU discourse also acknowledges that there are risks and opportunities, it clings to a uniform, singular response to deal with this situation. This response consists in declaring the EU a knowledge-based economy, connected to a related knowledge society. In March 2000, during the Lisbon European Council, the heads of State and government decided to make the EU “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy (KBE) in the world, capable of sustained economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment” (Lisbon Council, 2000). The KBE was meant to meet the challenges of globalization and to improve the EU’s global position in terms of knowledge and research (Robertson, 2008). In terms of an ontological worldview, however, it was disputed by the former president of the European Commission Jacques Delors, who warned that this perspective would do little to endear people to the EU. It simply would not incite enthusiasm, nor would it create a narrative that people necessarily want to live up to. After mentioning the progress made, and the significance of the four freedoms, Delors (1989, p.3) stated:

But – as I have often said in recent months – you cannot fall in love with the single market. Fernand Braudel, a lucid observer of the moves towards integration in the early 1960s, was thinking of the same thing when he said: ‘It would be mistaking human nature to serve up nothing but clever sums; they look so pallid beside the heady, though not always mindless, enthusiasm which has mobilized Europe in the past. Can a European consciousness

be built purely on figures? Or is that not precisely what figures may fail to capture, what may develop in ways that cannot be calculated?

That is why I am constantly stressing the need not only for a frontier-free area but also for the flanking policies which will open up new horizons for the men and women who make up this Community of ours.

Apparently, Delors shares the view generally held in discourse theory – as stated above – that politics requires passion, something to get emotional or enthusiastic about. His words also remind us of Hannah Arendt, who states that philosophy (in the case of Delors politics) has to refer to men (and women), not to Man. Perhaps, had the EU engaged with a narrative based on Giddens’ definition of a high opportunity, high risk society, the EU might have been more successful than it currently seems to commit its member states – and the men and women who populate them – to join forces and talents to make the most of the opportunities and to manage the risks.

ANALYSIS OF UNESCO AND EU DOCUMENTS ON LIFELONG EDUCATION AND LIFELONG LEARNING (1970-2003)

In 2013, during the ATEE (Association for Teacher Training in Europe) conference in Halden, Norway, Gert Biesta presented a key note speech on what he considered to be the pedagogical problems pertaining to the discourse on lifelong learning and the ‘learnification’ of education. Biesta observes that ‘learning’ is something very different from ‘education’. While education entails a purpose, specific contents, a program and a pedagogical relation, learning is a process and an individual activity (Biesta 2013, 2014). He describes a shift in the EU discourse, from a narrative about lifelong education (Delors et al., 1996) to a discourse about lifelong learning (Lisbon 2003). These pedagogical concerns about lifelong learning raised my interest in the discursive construction of this particular policy. I therefore decided to perform a discursive analysis of key documents about lifelong learning in the EU. I was interested in observing how this discursive shift from education to learning took form and through which discursive mechanisms this was realized. I analyzed five documents.^{vi}

The documents of Faure (1972) and Delors (1996) had to do with lifelong education and were concerned with creating an intelligent society, capable of creating a *learning society* that is able to address the challenges of a globalized future. In the document of Faure, for instance, the idea of a scientific humanism (Faure et al., 1972, pp. 146-147) was paramount. The idea was that education should include economy and ought to be based on scientific insights and technological opportunities. However, it should be a *humanized* education:

The search for a new educational order is based on scientific and technological training, one of the essential components of scientific humanism. However, we could also say real humanism, in the sense that scientific humanism rejects any preconceived, subjective or abstract idea of man. The kind of person it concerns is a concrete being, set in a historical context, in a set period. Education depends on objective knowledge, but that which is essentially and resolutely directed towards action and primarily in the service of man himself (Faure et al., 1972, p. 146).

Delors et al. (1996, p. 17) envision the following strategy to deal with the challenges of globalization:

Education has to face up to this problem [people being torn between globalization and searching for roots and a sense of belonging, NMM] now more than ever as a world society struggles painfully to be born: education is at the heart of both personal and community development; its mission is to enable each of us, without exception, to develop all our talents to the full and to realize our creative potential, including responsibility for our own lives and achievement of our personal aims.

The EU documents following the Lisbon Council in 2000 marked a radical shift, in the sense that they drastically turned these logics around. Lifelong learning was indeed set up to address the challenges of the future, but now it was the system that invested in people:

Given the current uncertain economic climate, investing in people becomes all the more important” (Commentary, 2001, 1.1).

Lifelong learning was now defined as:

all learning activity undertaken throughout life, with the aim of improving knowledge, skills and competences within a personal, civic, social and/or employment-related perspective (Commentary, 2001, 1.4., italics in original).

In the EU discourse, it was no longer envisioned that Europeans would create an economy and a society to address the challenges of the future, rather, the knowledge based society and the knowledge based economy became juxtaposed. It was now established that lifelong learning was the singular and secure answer to adapt to the demands of the knowledge based economy.

The discursive mechanisms to realize this shift, included remarkable recontextualizations. It recontextualized the learning society of Faure and Delors to a knowledge-based society. The emphasis was no longer on the development of human intelligence and power, but on governments who invest in human capital. The EU discourse marked a shift from lifelong education to lifelong learning. Within the discourse on lifelong learning, teacher-centred education now became ‘learner-centred services’, students became ‘learners’ while teachers now became ‘learner facilitators’.

Particular discursive mechanisms to realize these shifts to a knowledge-based economy and to lifelong learning, included the accumulation of statements and the absence of arguments. A consideration of possible alternatives and grounds for selecting the policy on lifelong learning is absent. The documents manifest a singular understanding of ‘learning’. But, as Biesta pointed out in his keynote, learning to ride a bike is not the same as learning to be patient or learning math. The same holds true for knowledge. Both terms are taken for granted. But in this book we have seen that there are different forms of knowledge: some are detached from human life, others are attached (Polanyi, 2009). Some are merely cognitive, while other forms of knowledge are holistic and include emotions and intuition. What counts as knowledge, and when? Which categories of knowledge can be distinguished and which of these should we aim at? These questions are not raised or addressed in these documents.

Furthermore, there was in these texts a remarkable construction of equivalencies. Close analysis of the texts showed that in the EU discourse, inclusion is equal to employability and not, for instance, to being socially integrated in a society – or to being accommodating towards others in that society.

Another discursive strategy was that of nominalization. All Europeans and other citizens forming part of the EU were brought together in one noun – ‘human capital’. This particular nominalization of a citizenship as diverse as that of the EU, seems to be symbolic for a tendency to suppress complexity and plurality – a process that so many thinkers included in this book have warned against. ‘Human capital’ is a concept that seems to ignore the many cultural, historical, and economic differences between citizens in different European countries.

On the other hand, concepts such as ‘lifelong learning’, have been personified:

Lifelong learning *takes* a comprehensive view of the supply and demand for learning opportunities. It *values* knowledge and competences gained in all spheres of modern life, and which *are* therefore *relevant* to coping with modern society (Commentary 2001, 1.1) (my italics).

This short description of the initial outcome of this discursive analysis of the EU discourse on lifelong learning, shows an inversion which leads from people investing in a system like Faure and Delors proclaimed, to a system which invests in people. Discursively, this has been achieved through the attribution of human capacities to concepts – like the system of lifelong learning – while nominalizing and singularizing European citizens.

Looking back through the lens of this book, it seems to me that the EU discourse on lifelong learning represents a ‘silent ideology’ (see Chapter 4 by Blaauwendraad). A deeper conclusion based on the theories underlying this book, is that worldviews can be attached or detached, in the same way that knowledge can be attached or detached (Polanyi, 2009; Van Ewijk, 2013). Returning to the ontological worldviews presented above, Rotman’s dynamic view on society seems to be attached to the transformations of our time. Compared to this perspective, the EU discourse on lifelong learning and the knowledge society seems detached. It is a top-down policy that is indicted on European education, thus ignoring the bottom up activity that Rotmans recognizes. It does not talk about ‘the men and women who make the community’ as Delors has it: instead, it invests in human capital. The EU does not seem too concerned with processes; it sets a system for education, further stabilized through the Dublin descriptors for the entire EU, now called ‘the European area of higher education’. In other words, in the context of this book I gained the insight that, just in the manner that knowledge can be attached or detached – as Polanyi (2009) points out – so can worldviews be attached or detached. I suggest that the worldview of the EU represents an example of a detached worldview informed by a silent ideology.

TRACES OF A SILENT IDEOLOGY IN SOCIETY

This new awareness led to a hermeneutic understanding of various observations made during previous research that I now began to see, in part, as results or symptoms of this silent ideology and its accompanying detached worldview, that steers European society and its educational system. I will list and describe these observations, first, in terms of observed features in our current society, and second, by situating them in the educational system in the next section.

A Singular, Instrumental View on Society: The Silent Ideology and the Silent Crisis

So what does this society look like? According to Martha Nussbaum (2010), the last three or four decades have revealed a 'silent crisis' in the sense that schools prepare children to become cogs in an economic machine, due to the fact that children are being prepared 'for the job' rather than for becoming democratic citizens. Seen through the lens of Arendt as presented in Chapter 3: this implies that children are prepared for 'work', not for 'action'. Blaauwendraad shows how the discourse of the current Dutch government and its recent legislation on citizenship aims at an adaptive form of citizenship. Both children and newcomers – the migrant population – have to *adapt* to Dutch culture and society. Nothing is said in these documents about democratic citizenship which would help children and migrants to discuss, to debate, to learn about and from each other, to think critically and morally about oneself, about others and society at large. In other words, newcomers are not being prepared for 'action', nor for political citizenship. Furthermore, the Dutch culture that pupils, students and migrants are supposed to adapt to, is a construct, it is an imaginary of a homogeneous Dutch population prior to the effects of globalization. By no means it helps children or migrants to prepare for the heterogeneous, multicultural, 'liquid' society that we all live in. Students, then, are not being prepared to protect plurality and to engage with it. Though this policy may be consistent with its underlying silent ideology which denies plurality, it is, indeed, detached from our current, heterogeneous, globalized society.

The Lack of Morality in Education and Other Professions

A concern of Mouffe (1993/2205) is that 'morality' in the instrumentalized democracy has been removed from public life, being marginalized to the private realm. Several significant claims have been made about the lack of morality in professions relating to finance, law and education.

Joris Luyendijk is a Dutch journalist who lives in London and who has interviewed over 200 people who worked for the City, the European financial centre in London. He did this for his blogs in The Guardian, and he later published a Dutch book about it, entitled "Dit kan niet waar zijn" (This can't be true) (Luyendijk, 2015). He describes the amorality of the banking culture in detail. Banks are not consciously immoral; the issue of 'right' and 'wrong' just does not appear in their discourse. There is no check whether a new product is morally right; the main criterion is whether the risk on reputation damage is acceptable. Being professional requires being unemotional and amoral (Luyendijk, 2015, pp. 88-89).

Jaap Winter, president of the board of VU Amsterdam and a specialist in corporate governance in Europe and in the Netherlands, told his colleagues during a public speech at the beginning of the fifth national conference of legal professionals, that the legal officers had failed as a professional community.

As long as we only consider whether something is legally possible, without taking social consequences into account, we fail as a community (Winter, 2016).

Winter refers to the financial crisis where legal officers did nothing, or far too little, to prevent amoral ways of acting on behalf of the banks:

We should educate our students in that they learn to question not only whether something is permitted within the rules, but whether it is morally acceptable.

Winter stated that the existing training programs fall short on this issue. These courses, programs consisting of three years bachelor and one year master, are barely enough to teach the minimum. It will be difficult to actually insert a moral dimension (*idem*).

In terms of education, the Dutch professor of education Micha de Winter, states that the current, dominant, instrumental form of education, leads to an undermining of the values of our society:

As I stated before, the past years and decades education is organized in terms of economic interest. The school has become an institute to prepare children for the knowledge economy. As said before, this is a very restricted understanding of education. It is, furthermore, dangerous, since it denies the important educational task of the school, thus undermining the basic values that underpin our society (De Winter, 2013, p. 74).

Ricoeur (1995) reminds us that we should evaluate our actions in terms of whether these are good for ourselves, for others and for our institutions, and for the world at large (see Chapter 4, Blaauwendraad). Applying this procedure to the situation described above, the following picture emerges. The amoral attitude of bankers is good for themselves, because they make money and they keep their job. It is, however, not good for other citizens in society, because it is their capital that is gambled with and, in the case of the financial crisis, the disastrous results were presented to the tax

payer. It was also not good for the institutions, the banks, who lost their reputation and in some cases their autonomy when some of the banks (temporarily) came under state power. It created a huge credibility crisis within the affected societies, and it has had devastating effects on those sectors of the population who lost their jobs and/or their houses. Again, in the case of the restricted approach that Winter criticized within the legal professions, the amoral behaviour of lawyers may have been good for themselves, since they could make money and do their jobs. But again, it is not good for society for the reasons Winter mentioned and also not good for the legal institutions or for encouraging the – already strongly diminished – confidence that citizens have in legal institutions (see also Boutellier, 2015). In the case of education, amorality is even more problematic since it undermines the core task of the school as an institution aimed at preparing new generations for their social and moral functioning in society, thus undermining the values of a democratic society (see De Winter, 2013). This will be the topic of the following section, since I will now turn from mechanisms identified in the general domain of society to those encountered in the field of education.

FEATURES OF THE SILENT IDEOLOGY IN EDUCATION

In performing the task of identifying specific mechanisms in education, I perform a re-reading of earlier research conducted in the classroom, as indicated in the introduction to this chapter. The original research results have been published. The paragraphs below do not contain new information, but instead offer a personal reflection on these intense research experiences in the light of the concerns and the theoretical frame presented in this book.

Instrumentalized Systems of Administration and Management: the Logic of Indifference

During the last two research projects which I performed within schools, I encountered instrumentalized systems that focus on the *administration* of the educational practice rather than on the educational practice itself. The administration seemed to be prioritized above the teachers and pupils who actually create that practice. To speak in Schön's terms: they relied on the high grounds while ignoring the swampy lowlands of daily practice. I encountered this phenomenon particularly while I did research on induction (2012-2013) (Fruytier, Goorhuis & Montesano Montessori, 2013) and on social security (2013-2015) (Broersma, Ossenblok & Montesano Montessori, 2015). For this chapter I will restrict my observations to the research on induction. The aim was to resolve the alleged problem that too many novice teachers left the profession within five years. The research was intended to help to bring down the reported 20% of novice teachers leaving the profession, to a lesser 10%. We performed both quantitative and qualitative analyses in 65 schools in Utrecht. One of our findings was that the emphasis on 'school culture' within most schools was a prominent problem, both found in the literature (Wong, 2004) and in our empirical research. Novice teachers were drawn into this existing culture, being induced to follow the normal customs in agreement with 'this is the way we do it'. There tends to be little interest in the new input of the novice teacher and little occasion for a dialogue between experienced and novice teachers. Hence, the emphasis is on socialisation rather than on subjectification, thus leaving little or no room for the influence by the potential natality of novice teachers, thus reproducing the existing school culture. The interviews revealed that novice teachers wanted to receive feedback and preferred to have this arranged in a two-way fashion. Mutual observation by the supervisor and the supervisee was their ideal, with also a mutuality in giving and receiving feedback. We have not observed that this desired practice of mutuality happened in any of the schools. However, this mutuality would lead to a healthy dialogue between tradition and innovation, which would be a powerful way to engage in a strong learning environment. In this context I recall an interview with a novice teacher who had asked her superior to come and observe in her classroom. The answer was: "I am not interested in what you are doing in the classroom. I am interested in your performance during our formal meetings".

A second finding was that programs of induction and supervision differed from school to school. As it turned out, the Netherlands was the only European country that lacked a formal program for induction (ECSWD-SEC, 2010). Whatever program there was, was often run by teachers without a specific training to perform this task of supporting novice teachers. Instruments such as supervision, coaching and instruction were found to be ad hoc and in most cases were not part of a systematic induction program. Literature indicates that instruments that are not part of a full induction program, are mere mechanisms, thus losing their potential strength (Wong, 2004). Supervision was not so much put in place to help the novice teacher, as to judge whether the novice teacher should be appointed to a permanent position or should leave after one year. Teachers who remained after the first year, did not receive any further special support, while literature strongly suggests to create a well-organized induction program that should last up to five years and in which the teacher training institute should play an active role (Wong, 2004).

A third remarkable feature – in the context of this chapter – was that most schools did not have well recorded 'exit policies'. Most schools did not organize an exit assignment with the leaving novice (or other) teachers, thus losing a strong potential tool for learning. I recall an interview with a novice teacher in physical education, who was

very motivated and who saw physical education as a means to teach children about life: how to win, how to lose, how to cope with disappointment, and so on. He, too, was disappointed that nobody had visited him in the classroom. He was thinking about returning to Brazil, where he had performed an internship with children in the slums, in order to work with them. I still remember this interview very well. It indicated that, in case this teacher indeed returned to Brazil, the school might not even have been aware of having had a highly motivated and well qualified teacher in their team, because of the observed lack of organized exit policies.

During an interview, a school director said that in his opinion, middle managers should spend at least 60% of their time with the people they supervise. But he observed that they fail to do so: they spend most of their time behind the computer or in meetings with other managers. An outcome of this research was that supervisors in education should not just have managerial expertise. They should know about contents, have a certain reputation in their field and they should have the desire and the capacity to train and motivate novice – and experienced – teachers (Wong, 2014; Fruytier, Goorhuis & Montesano Montessori, p. 12).

What is written above is not meant as a critique on the professionals in question. The main image that I was left with after a year of interviews and interaction with the professional population was that of goldfish in a bowl, barely capable of getting enough breath in a context in which they were confined to a single-loop recurrent performance. There just did not seem to be any time to sit down and reflect and penetrate to the deeper dimensions of teaching. Perhaps the ‘logic of indifference’ represented a bigger loss in education than the alleged tendency of novice teachers to leave the profession.

PROMISING MOMENTS OF REFLECTION AND INNOVATION

My research has also shown evidence of what happens when occasions for true learning and investigating occur. I will mention an example in education which occurred while conducting the research project on social justice (Montesano Montessori & Ponte, 2012) and an example within national and global society as part of my research on social entrepreneurial movements (Montesano Montessori, 2016). The research was performed in four primary schools (2008-2010) and teachers, student-teachers and pupils participated in a setting of participatory action research. In the process, the work definition for social justice emerged as ‘enhancing the potential of self-control in pupils’. At some point, the teachers started questioning their own position and their tendency to control the group as a unit, rather than to enter in significant contact with individual children. They formulated research questions in this direction, based on which they experimented with more individualized forms of teaching. A remarkable *shift of power relations* emerged, in which children created an organic order in the classroom, while teachers provided support to individual children or to groups, following their needs and ideas. Not only was the climate in the classroom more pleasant, the individual children turned out to be very capable and creative in resolving their own conflicts, and in discussing with each other and with the teacher what they understood social justice to be (see Montesano Montessori & Schuman, 2015, for further details).

A second example about the innovative potential linked to triple-loop learning, occurred during my research on three social movements in the Netherlands (2012-2015), during which I interviewed the leaders of these movements. The movements were: Masterpeace, Zeitgeist and Giving is All we Have. The most remarkable outcome of the initial interviews was that every leader presented the vision that our current society hinges on outdated structures and erroneous priorities, which constrain social development (Montesano Montessori, 2016). This dissatisfaction with the dominant worldviews was their main incentive to start or engage with what I called *social entrepreneurial movements*. For them, the essential part was to question and modify what they thought of as outdated paradigms, in order to create a more peaceful, sustainable and giving world, respectively.

These two examples provide evidence that for change to happen, one needs to be granted the opportunity to engage in processes of double- and triple-loop learning. Change requires the posing of significant questions that are partly moral in nature. The teachers questioned whether their routines were really good for the children; the social leaders questioned the worldviews that dominate our society. The current educational system, caught up as it is in measurable procedures, does not seem to get this opportunity sufficiently.

TOWARDS A PLURALIST SOCIETY: RESTORING THE RES PUBLICA

This chapter started with a discourse theoretical account about the suppression of plurality in a society run by an instrumentalized government that claims universality and marginalizes values to the private sphere. In agreement with Arendt (1958), Laclau and Mouffe claim that this loss of plurality in the political discourse and in governance represents a danger for democracy. In order to recover this space of pluralism and the struggle between antagonistic

groups, Mouffe suggests a new approach to politics that combines the freedom and pluralism of liberalism with the commonality and unification of the democracy. She suggests that citizens should identify with the ethico-political principles of democracy and that there are as many forms of citizenship as interpretations of these principles. This idea includes a reformulation of the distinction between the private and the public sphere. Rather than the current distinction between a universalist definition of the public, while difference and particularisms are considered private, the *res publica* that Mouffe envisions, combines the two. All citizens maintain their own particular identity and remain responsible for their own decisions; but they submit their actions to the ethico-political principles agreed in the *res publica* to balance the contrasting ideals of freedom and equality. Hence, the actions of one citizen cannot imply the exclusion of another citizen. In this proposal, the private and the public are not separate spheres; private freedom is regulated by the ethical and political agreement that all citizens of a community are committed to and live up to (Mouffe, 1993/2005, pp. 69-73).

But what does this require from education? I would suggest that it requires the virtuosic citizenship that Blaauwendraad advocates. Children, students and migrants should learn about the ethico-political contract of their community and should learn how to keep it meaningful and how to live up to it. This requires an educational system that educates children *both* in the direction of socialization *and* subjectification, both in work *and* action. As has been suggested in part II, it requires an educational system that is concerned with morality and teaches pupils and students to make moral judgements and decisions as part of their development of practical wisdom.

WHY COMPLEXITY MATTERS

This chapter has provided evidence that plurality in society, which Arendt warned about almost sixty years ago, is still highly relevant today. At the same time, the chapter has shown features of the EU discourse on lifelong learning which discursively suppress complexity, for instance by reducing European citizens to 'human capital'. The discourse on the knowledge-based economy and the related discourse on lifelong learning has made European citizens and their educational system subject to the governments and the institutions that lead them. The question is, however, whether the concept of lifelong learning delivers what it pretends: to construct the most competitive knowledge-based economy and to prepare citizens for the challenges of our times. Would that not ask for a free, challenging system where, indeed, citizens were trained to become virtuosic citizens and to seriously engage with subjectification, that dimension that Biesta brings forward so as to prepare citizens for action and not just for work? The discourse on lifelong learning seems to have produced a system that emphasizes socialization rather than subjectification and, as Blaauwendraad has shown, implicitly makes pupils and migrants adapt to an imagined pre-globalized version of society, thus eliminating the complexities of today's heterogeneous globalized society. Does this help citizens face this complex heterogeneity? At the basis of all of this, the discourse of lifelong learning implies a democratic dilemma. It assumes that institutions invest in people. But, in a democracy, should not precisely citizens gauge and check its democratically selected institutions? How can democratic citizens do this if they are discursively subjected to the system that invests in them? In times of measurement as Biesta has it, the educational system necessarily engages in processes of predictable, measurable, pre-arranged educational programs. It lacks time to engage with fundamental, humanist knowledge needed to defend humanism in education and in politics. Schools lack time for reflection, for asking significant questions, for (moral) deliberation and judgement, and have even less time for critically gauging the systems that dominate them. It puts the educational system in a position in which it necessarily reproduces the ideology that informs it, thus creating a self-sustaining loop. To free ourselves from this loop, we may need a serious public discussion and serious political efforts to reformulate the EU discourse on lifelong learning in humanist terms – as the predecessors of the EU apparently did – and to urge the EU to take complexity on board. Looking back at the simple example of the teacher of physical education who remained unseen in his school, how many civic treasures in Europe remain unseen? If the EU reintroduces the human factor and subsequent complexities in its discourse, it might then be able to tap into the talents, creativity and motivation of both its member states and its citizens to make the best of the opportunities and risks of these times. It might help the EU to keep its member states engaged in a common project to contribute to a balanced society and a balanced world order.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has looked at complexity and plurality in discourse and society. It has been the result of two academic operations. In the first place, it has added an additional – discourse theoretical – lens to look at plurality and complexity in politics and in society. Secondly, it has performed a re-reading of earlier research through the lens of normative professionalization and related theories as presented in the first two parts of this book. These two operations

have led to a series of insights. First, the discourse theoretical analysis of the politics of our times and the emergence of populism reaffirm that Arendt's warnings about maintaining plurality are still highly relevant today. Second, it has observed that just as knowledge can be attached to or detached from human nature, so can worldviews. It has provided some evidence to support the conclusion that the EU discourse on lifelong learning is indeed detached from reality and entails a silent ideology. Particular problems with the discourse on lifelong learning produced by the EU since the Lisbon Council in 2000, are the singularization of both learning and knowledge and the reduction of European citizens to one singular noun 'human capital'. It has inverted the previous logics of earlier UNESCO documents that advocated ideas of a learning society, and of a scientific but real humanism intended to engage with the challenges of globalization, to an order in which the system invests in people. The chapter has marked a series of social and educational features, such as amorality and increased instrumentality, and has interpreted these as symptoms of a society and education run by a silent, detached ideology. It has also shown examples of innovation and suggested that these were the result of moments of reflection and triple-loop learning, conditions that most schools today do not have available. It has presented a promising imaginary derived of discourse theory for an improved democracy in which citizens are committed to an ethico-political bound within a *res publica*. It has stated that this requires the kind of education described in part II of this book. This is difficult to achieve, since schools have been made subject to the system. The final conclusion is that, for these changes to happen, we need a humanized discourse on education, which takes complexity on board.

NOTES

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ⁱ The research on induction was commissioned by: 'Regionaal Platform Onderwijsarbeidsmarkt Utrecht vo/mbo' (Regional Platform Education Labour Market Utrecht) and executed by the research group 'Organisatieconfiguraties en Arbeidsrelaties' (Organisation Configurations and Employment Relationships) of the HU University of Applied Sciences Utrecht. Date of the rapport: 29-04-2013. Url: <http://www.voion.nl/publicaties/verbetering-inductiefase-beginnende-leraren>. Last retrieved August 28, 2016.

ⁱⁱ The research on social justice was performed in the context of the research group 'Behaviour and research in educational praxis' at the HU University of Applied Sciences Utrecht (2008-2012). I conducted the participatory research performed in the schools acting as a project leader.

ⁱⁱⁱ The research on social entrepreneurship was performed at VU University where I was granted visiting scholar status (2011-2014).

^{iv} The analysis of the discourse on lifelong learning is still in progress. I presented the initial results as summarized in this chapter at the International School for the Study of Argumentation (Amsterdam, 1-4 July, 2014).

^v I presented this account on populism and the social and educational features of a society conducted by a silent ideology described in this chapter during a symposium '(Kritische) Discoursanalyse en -Theorie in Vlaanderen en Nederland' (Critical) Discourse Analysis and Theory in Flanders and The Netherlands) held at the University of Antwerp, April 20, 2016.

^{vi} The analysis was performed on five documents:

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This study is still work in progress, but I presented the initial results described in this chapter during the International School for the Study of Argumentation Conference (Amsterdam, in 2014).